An Analysis of Bank Loan Rate Indexation

This paper examines the economic rationale for the use of bank loan commitments and the effect on the allocation of bank credit of indexing the loan rate offered through the commitment to the prime. A simple model of the loan market is constructed and used to examine the effect changes in loan demand and the cost of bank funds have on the allocation of bank credit under indexation. It is shown that indexing implies changes in the relative cost of borrowing for certain groups of bank customers. For nonprime customers, an increase in the cost of bank funds results in a decline in the relative cost of borrowing under commitments. The pattern of commitment use is found to be consistent with the predictions of the model.     

Using the Murphy Model to Provide Short-run Macroeconomic Closure for ORANI

A macro model incorporating rational expectations in financial markets (the Murphy Model–MM) is used to endogenize the macroeconomic environment for a comprehensive general equilibrium model (ORANI). The interface exploits the existence of variables which are endogenous to both models, calibrating on a shock to government spending. Prospective benefits include: (1) to the numerous policy oriented users of ORANI, a facility allowing the macroeconomic environment to be determined by a macrodynamic model such as MM; (2) to these users, reassurance that ORANI's short-run translates in calendar time to about two years; (3) to the clientele of a macro model, the possibility of much more detailed projections.     

La valeur économique de l’audit et son efficacité dans le fonctionnement de l’école publique

Les auteurs examinent l’incidence de l’audit sur le fonctionnement de l’école publique en poursuivant deux objectifs : déterminer si les audits procurent des avantages économiques aux parties prenantes et définir l’incidence de la complexité des règles à observer sur l’efficacité de l’audit. Utilisant des données relatives au temps consacréà l’audit et profitant de l’occasion unique offerte par la Quality Basic Education Act en Georgie, les auteurs estiment le rendement relatif des activités des arrondissements scolaires au moyen d’une méthode stochastique d’estimation des frontières. Ils constatent que l’audit produit de véritables avantages économiques pour les parties prenantes en atténuant le manque d’efficience de l’utilisation des ressources scolaires. Ils constatent également que la rigueur des règles à observer réduit l’efficacité de l’audit mais que l’expérience des auditeurs peut contribuer à surmonter ce problème. Le fait que les coûts d’audit ne soient pas communiqués entrave la réalisation d’une analyse coûts‐avantages des nouvelles exigences. L’analyse des auteurs vient confirmer la thèse selon laquelle l’audit est indispensable à l’établissement de mécanismes de gouvernance et la communication des coûts d’audit est importante dans l’évaluation adéquate d’une nouvelle politique. Les données pertinentes peuvent être obtenues auprès des sources publiques indiquées dans le texte.     

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity‐based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity‐score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.     

Sell‐Side School Ties

We study the impact of social networks on agents’ ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational background of sell‐side analysts and senior corporate officers, we find that analysts outperform by up to 6.60% per year on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. Pre‐Reg FD, this school‐tie return premium is 9.36% per year, while post‐Reg FD it is nearly zero. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the U.K.), the school‐tie premium is large and significant over the entire sample period.     

When It's Not The Only Game in Town: The Effect of Bilateral Search on the Quality of a Dealer Market

We report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where we allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large—unlike in models with risk-neutral, competitive dealers. However, when we allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.